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Abstract 
Despite of the fact that the body on international marketing focuses on emerging markets is growing, the attention 
paid to the Latin American context continues to be very limited. In an attempt to enhance the knowledge that 
managers and scholars have on franchising expansion, the present study examines how a number of market 
conditions may constrain diffusion of franchising into those nations. They are: i) geographical distance; ii) cultural 
distance; iii) uncertainty avoidance; iv) individualism; and vi) economic development. Also, we controlled for the 
host country’s economic potential, political stability, unemployment rate, and corruption. This study uses a 
quantitative approach applied to a sample of 63 Spanish franchisors operating through 2,321 franchisee outlets across 
20 Latin American countries in January 2010. They are: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, 
Peru, Puerto Rico, Uruguay and Venezuela. Results conclude that cultural distance between the host and home 
country, as well as the level of host’s country economic development and potential are able to constrain the spread of 
international franchising across Latin American nations. In sum, this work explores how market conditions may drive 
international diffusion of franchising into Latin American markets. The scant theoretical or empirical attention given 
to this topic has usually been examined from a U.S. base and focused on developed markets. To fill this gap, the 
present study analyzes the international spread of the Spanish franchise system (ranked fifth in worldwide terms) into 
Latin America as a market for franchising expansion. Thus, franchisors may use the results of this study as a 
benchmark study and a starting point for identifying the Latin American regions whose characteristics best meet their 
needs of expansion 
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility 7th International 
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1. Introduction 
The literature on franchising has fully covered issues such as why firms should organize as a franchise 
chain and engage franchisees (Lafontaine and Kaufmann, 1994; Alon, 2001; 2005), franchising efficiency 
(Lafontaine, 1992), and the relationship between franchisor and franchisee (Sanders, 2002). In contrast, 
although recently greater effort has been made to examine the scope of franchising from an international 
standpoint, international franchising has generally received limited academic attention (Quinn and 
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Doherty, 2000; Alon, 2010). Moreover, the scant theoretical and empirical attention given to this topic 
has generally been examined from a U.S. and British base. Thus, there is a great need for a deeper 
explanatory models of international diffusion via franchising, one that can explore this issue by focusing 
on franchising systems other than those from the U. S. or British models. 
The present study attempts to cover this gap by introducing a model that explores a set of host country 
factors in the rate of the Spanish franchise diffusion among Latin American nations. This because, 
although franchising in the U.S., Canada, and parts of Western Europe has reached domestic market 
saturation (Alon, 2010), Latin American markets remain relatively untapped. This is surprising given the 
substantive economic importance of the region with a population over 550 million, and a GDP of 
approximately US$4 trillion. Additionally, most Latin American countries, including the largest ones 
(Argentina, Mexico, Brazil, Chile, Peru, Venezuela, and Colombia), show per capita GDP greater than 
that of China in 2009, as of 2010 Latin America included five nations classified as high-income countries: 
Chile, Mexico, Argentina, Uruguay and Panama. Nevertheless, research in international marketing in the 
Latin American context is very limited (Birnik and Browman, 2007; Fastoso and Whitelock, 2010). 
Specifically, we propose a set of variables as those affecting international expansion into Latin America 
via franchising. In order to advance our understanding, we focus on the Spanish franchise system, which 
since 2008 has been fifth worldwide both in terms of the number of franchisors (1,019) and the quantity 
of franchisee outlets (65,026) having presence in 112 foreign countries through 172 chains with a total of 
10,186 outlets in early 2010. As a result, we think this work may be useful not only to academics wishing 
to enhance their knowledge about international franchising, but also to franchise chains willing to 
establish new outlets in Latin America. These will be our major contributions. 
2. Theoretical framework and proposition development 
Transaction cost analysis (TCA) offers a rich framework for examining the efficiency of franchising. It 
posits that firms choose to internalize or externalize exchange relationship based primarily on cost 
incurred in the exchange process (Liang, Musteen and Datta, 2009). This framework asserts that 
franchising is a hybrid organization form, located somewhere between the extremes of vertical integration 
on the one hand, and completely independent operations on the other. For the franchisor, this agent-
principal relation will impact appreciably on the success or failure of foreign market entry by using a 
particular organizational form (Burton, Cross and Rhodes, 2000). Therefore, a framework based on TCA 
is developed to infer the variables constraining international franchising expansion into Latin American 
markets, based on a country level perspective. 
2.1. Geographical Distance 
Multinational companies tend to internationalize through country markets that are more easily understood 
by managers (Rahman, 2003). According to this point, Fladmoe-Lindquist (1996) posed the problem of 
geographical distance from the standpoint of efficiency by showing that under geographical distance 
monitoring activities are more difficult and expensive. Furthermore, geographical distance makes 
logistical support more difficult especially when inputs have to be imported from the home country. The 
above-mentioned costs are substantially higher in foreign markets that span continents and time zones, 
despite recent improvements in transportation and communication technology. Under these conditions, 
franchising may help to prevent moral hazardous and adverse selection without requiring site visits with 
their accompanying travel difficulties, and the need for regional monitoring facilities in global markets 
(Sashi and Karuppur, 2002). Firms can then reduce monitoring cost by involving local partners as 
franchisees in distant markets. Nevertheless we can also argue the opposite effect. This is because as 
spatial distance increases, however, so too will transaction costs. Search costs may increase because 
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franchisors need to expend greater resources to identify and contract with acceptable candidates for 
franchisees. Moreover, servicing costs may increase if elements of the franchise package need to be 
transported from home country to host country (Burton, Cross and Rhodes, 2000). Following the previous 
discussion, we propose the following: 
Hypothesis 1a: The expansion of franchising across Latin American nations will be positively associated 
with high geographical distance between the home and the host country. 
Hypothesis 1b: The expansion of franchising across Latin American nations will be negatively associated 
with high geographical distance between the home and the host country. 
2.2. Cultural Distance 
Traditionally, cultural distance has been fully considered by literature given that it is well known that 
differences among markets in cultural values hinder the transfer of management skills as well as 
company´s products and services, which involve higher transactions within an organization (Anderson 
and Gatignon, 1986). As reported in Fladmoe-Lindquist and Jacque (1995), franchising is more likely in 
countries that are culturally distant from the home country. Consequently, when cultural distances are 
small, firms may adopt the same mode of operation as in domestic markets, and only firms that franchise 
in the domestic market may prefer to do the same in global. In contrast, when cultural distances are 
significant, however, even firms that favor high ownership arrangements in domestic markets may prefer 
adopting low ownership agreements in global markets (Alon and McKee, 1999). Furthermore, companies 
operating globally will have to understand the complexity of different cultures in order to set standards 
for control and evaluation. Otherwise, firms would transfer the responsibility for such decisions to local 
partners, who will be able to set standard bases on local practices and regulations to evaluate the 
performance of the business and its employees (Sashi and Karuppur, 2002).  
On the basis of the preceding arguments, we argue that franchising may be chosen when cultural distance 
is significant as it allows franchisors to transfer responsibility for managing local operations to 
franchisees. However, we can also postulate the opposite effect because as cultural distance increase, 
transaction costs may increase if elements of the franchise package need tailoring to accommodate local 
market conditions (Eroglu, 1992). Furthermore, monitoring cost are likely to increase if differences in 
business ethics and practices between the franchisor and franchisee become more pronounced, rendering 
it less easy (or more costly) to ensure the satisfactory performance of the latter (Burton, Cross and 
Rhodes, 2000).  Therefore, we propose the following: 
Hypothesis 2a: The expansion of franchising across Latin American nations will be positively associated 
with higher cultural distance between the home and the host country. 
Hypothesis 2b: The expansion of franchising across Latin American nations will be negatively associated 
with higher cultural distance between the home and the host country. 
2.3. Uncertainty Avoidance and Individualism 
Hofstede’s research (1991) has revealed that cultures differ on four different dimensions: 1) tolerance for 
ambiguity or uncertainty avoidance; 2) power distance; 3) individualism/collectivism; and 4) masculinity. 
All of them were calculated for different countries and have been highly cited in the literature (Mitra and 
Golder, 2002). Related to the previous descriptions, entrepreneurs from cultures having high uncertainty 
avoidance (low tolerance for ambiguity) might be more likely to adopt franchising because of their lack 
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of willingness to take calculated jeopardy. Specifically, franchising has been traditionally considered as a 
method of economic development that reduces entrepreneurial risk by transferring a proven retail concept 
as well as management and marketing expertise (Michael, 2003). Nevertheless, franchising does not 
eliminate all business risks. In addition, people that scored high in uncertainty avoidance would prefer 
rules and structured circumstances rather than emotions and innovation. Consequently, it could be argued 
that local agents showing high uncertainty avoidance would prefer being employees rather than 
franchisees.  
Moreover, cultures that favor individual achievement and competition should tend to reward 
entrepreneurship, given that cultures with individualistic values are more likely to develop organizational 
strategies based on entrepreneurship, such as franchising (Hoffman and Preble, 2001). However, we could 
also predict the opposite effect as individualist people may prefer choosing their own decision 
(entrepreneurship) rather than been franchisees subjected to franchisor’s rules. Hence, based on the 
previous discussion we make the following propositions: 
Hypothesis 3a: The expansion of franchising across Latin American nations will be positively associated 
with national cultures possessing high uncertainty avoidance. 
Hypothesis 3b: The expansion of franchising across Latin American nations will be positively associated 
with national cultures possessing low individualism. 
Hypothesis 4a: The expansion of franchising across Latin American nations will be positively associated 
with national cultures possessing high individualism. 
Hypothesis 4b: The expansion of franchising across Latin American nations will be positively associated 
with national cultures possessing low individualism. 
2.4. Economic Development 
As economies become more affluent, there is a greater shift to services which, as shown by Hoffman and 
Preble (2001) provide more opportunities for firms to expand. Moreover, countries with high economic 
development usually imply less exposure to political and economic risk (Herrmann and Datta, 2002) and 
therefore, the number of franchisors willing to enter into increases (Alon, 2010). Nevertheless, we could 
also predict the opposite effect. This is because expanding across foreign countries via franchising entails 
several advantages for the franchisor as fewer financial resources required and reduced susceptibility to 
political economic and other risks (Quinn and Doherty, 2000; Welsh, Alon and Falbe, 2006). However, 
profits are shared with the local agent – franchisee -. As a result, companies entering into markets 
showing high economic potential and business growth may be willing to expand their business abroad by 
using their own resources (joint venture or 100% direct investment) and therefore, getting all business 
benefits. Based on the previous arguments we make the following propositions: 
Hypothesis 4a: The expansion of franchising across Latin American nations will be positively associated 
with countries possessing high economic development. 
Hypothesis 4b: The expansion of franchising across Latin American nations will be positively associated 
with countries possessing low economic development.
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3. Data gathering process and methodology 
Data on international franchising activity was obtained from the Spanish franchise system, which as of 
2008 has ranked fifth worldwide in terms of both the number of franchisors and the quantity of franchisee 
outlets. To test the hypotheses, we contacted the Spanish Franchise Association and the main Spanish 
franchising Consultant Group: Tormo & Asociados. We finally obtained data on 2,321 outlets established 
by 63 Spanish franchise chains across 20 Latin American nations in January 2010. Specifically, the list of 
Latin American countries comprises the following nations: Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, 
Barbados, Belice, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru, Puerto Rico, Saint Lucia, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, 
Suriname,Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela. In early 2010, Spanish franchisors were doing 
business in 20 of them: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Puerto 
Rico, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
3.1. Dependent Variables 
The international diffusion of franchising was assessed by considering the number of Spanish franchisee 
outlets (OUTLETS) located in Latin American countries. This variable spans from 1 franchisee outlet in a 
specific country (Haiti) to 498 (Mexico). As stated before, a total of 2,321 outlets were computed. 
However, this measure does not always reveal the degree of international expansion. Specifically, it is 
possible that some franchisors have different franchisee outlets located abroad but all of them established 
in the same foreign country. In this case, the international expansion of such a company would be very 
limited. In order to deal with this problem, we have created a second dependent variable to garner more 
information regarding the likelihood of choosing some markets for international expansion via 
franchising. This new variable is defined as the number of Spanish franchisors companies 
(FRANCHISOR) doing business in each Latin American country. This variable spans from 1 (Haiti) to 63 
(Mexico). Also, the international diffusion of foreign franchisors across Latin America was assessed by 
considering the franchising penetration among those markets (FRPENETR); that is, the number of 
Spanish franchisors in each Latin American nation divided by the number of franchisee outlets 
established by Spanish franchise chains in that country. It ranks from 1 (Haiti and Paraguay) to 29 
(Argentina). 
3.2. Independent and Control Variables 
The geographical distance (GEODIST) was determined by computing the kilometer distance between 
Spain (the home country of franchisors considered in this manuscript) and the Latin American country 
(host country). In some cases, we were not able to know the exact physical location of the franchisee 
outlets considered in this work. Thus, geographical distance was drawn from the kilometer distance 
between the capital of the franchisor’s home country (Madrid, by default), and the capital of the nation 
where the franchisee outlet is located. Cultural distance (CULTDIST) was assessed by using Hofstede’s 
(2001) work, which updates Hofstede’s (1980) study. This manuscript uses Kogut and Singh’s (1988) 
index on each of the Hofstede dimensions, an approach which has been used very often both in the 
traditional literature as well as in recent research (see. e.g., Sakarya, Eckman and Hyllegard, 2007; 
Slangen and Van Tulder, 2009, Yamin and Golesorkhi, 2010). In this data set the cultural distance index 
varies from 0 (for Spain, by default) to 6.69 (Venezuela). Data on uncertainty avoidance 
(UNCERAVOID) and individualism (INDIVIDUA) was also obtained from Hofstede’s (2001). 
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The level of economic development (ECODEV) was measured in terms of GDP per capita, because of its 
association with the population’s wealth, the extent of the middle class, and the level of development of 
the industrial and service sectors (Alon and McKee, 1999; Alon, 2010). Thus, data published by the 
International Monetary Fund in 2009 was considered. Political stability (POLITSTAB) was assessed by 
using data published in 2009 by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The 2009 World Bank Report 
was used to measure the unemployment rates of each nation (UNEMPLOY). Regarding the host 
country’s economic potential, it was measured by using data published by the International Monetary 
Fund in late 2009 about country population (POPULATION), as suggested in recent literature (see, e.g., 
Rahman, 2003; Sakarya, Eckman and Hyllegard, 2007). Finally, the Transparency International Index in 
2009 was considered to measure country corruption (TRANSPAREN).
4. Results 
The descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1. Additionally, Tables 2 and 3 show the results obtained 
from the regression analyses, respectively. We should point out that those variables that weren’t normally 
distributed entered the model in logarithmic form. Models 1a and 2a consider the number of Spanish 
franchisors (FRANCHISOR) in Latin American markets as a dependent variable. In contrast, in Models 
2a and 2b the dependent variable is measured by using the number of Spanish franchisee outlets 
(OUTLETS). Finally, in Models 3a and 3b the dependent variable is assessed by considering the Spanish 
franchise penetration among Latin American markets (FRPENETR). Furthermore, Models 1a, 2a, and 3a 
test whether cultural distance (CULTDIST) is one of the factors capable of constraining the spread of 
international franchising across Latin America. However, this study argues that a predicted effect of 
cultural distance may be only applicable to two of the five Hofstede cultural dimensions: uncertainty 
avoidance and individualism. As a result, in order to avoid heterocedasticity, Models 1b, 2b, and 3b 
examine the effect of these dimensions (RISKAVER and INDIVIDUA) by omitting the cultural distance 
variable.  
Table 1: descriptive statistics 
VARIABLES MAXIMUN MINIMUN MEAN STANDARD DEVIATION 
FRANCHISOR 63.000 1.000 5.690 13.416 
OUTLETS 498.000 1.000 8.251 170.024 
FRPENETR 29.000 1.000 2.331 8.392 
GEODIST 10,039.000 6,383.000 8,212.592 1,018.069 
CULTDIST 6.880 0.720 2.052 2.175 
RISKAVER 101.000 11.000 54.498 24.876 
INDIVIDUA 46.000 6.000 14.110 12.405 
POLITSTAB 42.600 1.500 4.471 9.228 
TRANSPAREN 7.800 1.900 3.422 1.701 
ECODEV 22.120 2.650 7.930 4.742 
UNEMPLOY 27.800 1.340 5.194 6.062 
POPULATION 193,024,000.000 3,322,000.000 8,768,747.441 47,746,371.689 
Focusing on Models 1a and 1b, results illustrate that the Latin American countries that attract more 
Spanish franchise chains (FRANCHISOR) are characterized by high levels of economic development 
(ECODEV) and cultural distance (CULTDIST). Thus, hypotheses H2a and H4a were supported at the 
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0.05 level. As mentioned, international expansion of franchising across Latin American markets has been 
analyzed not only according to the number of franchisors (FRANCHISOR) but also by considering the 
number of franchisee outlets located in those countries (OUTLETS). Results are shown in Models 2a and 
2b. The difference between these models is that the former uses cultural distance (CULTDIST) as an 
independent variable whereas this variable is substituted by individualism (INDIVIDUA) and uncertainty 
avoidance (RISKAVER) in Model 2b. As expected, the level of economic development (ECODEV) was 
significant and positively associated with the dependent variable in both models. Hence, H4a was 
supported at the 0.05 level.  
Furthermore, concerning the third dependent variable considered in this manuscript (FRPENETR), 
Models 3a and 3b show that Spanish franchise chains prefer to expand across Latin American nations 
characterized by largest levels of economic development (ECODEV) and therefore, hypothesis H4a was 
supported at the 0.05 level. Finally, the effect of market potential (POPULATION) on the franchise 
diffusion across Latin American countries was included as a control variable. Results show a positive and 
significant association between that variable and the number of Spanish franchise chains 
(FRANCHISOR), franchisee outlets (OUTLETS), as well the number of franchisors in comparison with 
the number of franchisee outlets (FRPENTR) in Latin America at the 0.05 level. 
Table 2: Regression analyses (Models 1a-3a) 









-5.024 0.124 -4.705 0.541 0.012 0.999 
GEODIST 
0.873 0.315 -0.454 0.832 1.211 0.503 
CULDIST 
0.564 0.018 0.494 0.328 0.790 0.845 
RISKAVER             
INDIVIDUA             
POLITSTAB 
0.065 0.928 -0.426 0.816 0.374 0.806 
TRANSPAREN
0.334 0.381 0.085 0.928 0.308 0.697 
UNEMPLOY 
-0,031 0,945 -0,083 0,701 -1,17 0,831 
ECODEV 
0.936 0.016 1.557 0.079 -6.680 0.327 
POPULATION 
0.210 1.142 0.953 0.022 -0.725 0.031 
  Dependent Variable: Franchisor Dependent Variable: Outlets Dependent Variable: Frpenetr 
  R²: 0.797 R²: 0.854 R²: 0.757 
  Adj. R²: 0.695 Adj. R²: 0.708 Adj. R²: 0.514 
  F = 8,750 p= 0.005 F = 5,851  p= 0.016 F = 3,116 p= 0.078
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Table 3: Regression analyses (Models 1b-3b)









-9157 0.311 -12381 0.391 4358 0.719 
GEODIST 
0.617 0.692 -2044 0.430 2466 0.287 
CULDIST 
            
RISKAVER 2403 0.402 6982 0.192 4754 0.255 
INDIVIDUA -0.550 0.213 -0.742 0.290 -0.196 0.733 
POLITSTAB 
0.878 0.552 1811 0.455 0.911 0.658 
TRANSPAREN
0.068 0.949 1967 0.284 2065 0.206 
UNEMPLOY 
-0,38 0,908 -0,152 0,778 -0,2 0,671 
ECODEV 
1458 0.840 3192 0.034 -1772 0.122 
POPULATION 
0.240 0,88 1267 0.017 -1010 0.023 
  Dependent Variable: Franchisor Dependent Variable: Outlets Dependent Variable: Frpenetr 
  R²: 0.845 R²: 0.811 R²: 0.739 
  Adj. R²: 0.567 Adj. R²: 0.649 Adj. R²: 0.549 
  F = 3.033 p= 0.117 F = 5,653  p= 0.035 F = 2,896  p= 0.126 
5. Discussion and conclusions 
Our results offer firm conclusions regarding the factors driving global franchising expansion. The factors 
we suggested determine which Latin American countries are more favored when entering markets 
through this type of business organization. Nonetheless, the results at the variable level are mixed. On the 
one hand, the positive coefficient of GDP per capita found in all the models emphasizes the idea that as 
the level of economic development increases, so too will market opportunities. Therefore, the number of 
foreign franchisor willing to enter into that nation increases. Another contribution of this paper is that it 
reveals that when cultural distances increases, firms operating globally will have to understand the 
complexity of different cultures in order to set standards for evaluation and monitoring (Alon and McKee, 
1999; Sashi and Karuppur, 2002). Therefore, according to the positive correlation of the aggregate 
cultural distance dimension with franchise diffusion, foreign investors prefer adopting low ownership 
agreements, like franchising, to transfer the responsibility for such decisions to local partners, who will be 
able to set standard bases on local practices and regulations to evaluate the performance of employees in 
Latin America. This paper also shows that Hofstede’s conceptualization of culture may not be valid for 
examining market conditions constraining international franchise diffusion across Latin American 
markets. Therefore, in spite of Hofstede’s (1980) study being cited on more than 1,000 occasions, and 
being widely used in the literature (Slangen and Van Tulder, 2009, Yamin and Golesorkhi, 2010), no 
significant association was found between this variable and five of the six models considered in this 
manuscript.  
Regarding the two other cultural hypotheses, results illustrate the expansion of franchising across Latin 
American nations is positively associated with cultures possessing low individualism and high uncertainty 
avoidance. This indicates that local agents view franchising as a method for minimizing business risk 
(transferring a proven successful business concept and the most efficient way to manage the firm). Thus, 
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agents with high uncertainty avoidance may opt for buying a franchise instead of opening a new business 
from scratch. Nevertheless, the fact that franchisees have to adopt the franchisor’s rules and decisions can 
help explain why franchising shows higher presence in countries characterized by low individualism. 
Nonetheless, we need to treat these claims with some caution, however, since they did not prove to be 
statistically significant. Likewise, none significant evidence was found among a host country’s political 
stability, transparency, unemployment and international expansion via franchising.  
In sum, the present study provides insights which prove that international franchising expansion into 
Latin American countries depends on various country variables that franchisors may evaluate before 
selecting suitable markets to enter. 
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